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1. Introduction 
Industrial organization has long recognized that market structure is the result of rational entry 
decisions by firms vis-à-vis the profit opportunities present in a market. Mankiw and Whinston 
(1986) show that, with fixed set-up costs, the free entry equilibrium in a large class of 
oligopolistic models typically exhibits an excessively large number of active firms. An emerging 
literature has introduced the Stackelberg notion of leadership in this endogenous market 
structure (EMS) context, where one firm has the opportunity to make its entry decisions before 
the other firms—see Etro (2013) for a recent survey. A general insight from this framework is 
that a leader facing endogenous entry tends to behave more aggressively (relative to the 
situation when the set of followers is predetermined). In this context the leader is most 
interested in influencing the entry decision of the followers, rather than their production/price 
decision. Specific results depend on the nature of the model. But in general the excessive entry 
result disappears, as it is common to find that equilibrium entails entry deterrence, i.e., there is 
only one firm (the leader) in the market (Etro, 2008). 
In this paper we extend the EMS framework by posing that the leader, in addition to being 
concerned about entry by other profit maximizing (PM) firms, also faces the threat of entry by 
coalitions of consumers (i.e., “cooperative firms”). In this context, the case of large fixed entry 
costs is of particular interest. For large enough fixed entry cost, even a firm unconstrained by 
the threat of subsequent entry cannot make positive profits. This situation represents one 
instance in which the excessive entry result noted earlier may not apply, i.e., equilibrium entry 
is of the “too few by one” kind (Mankiw and Whinston 1986): consumer surplus may be 
sufficient to cover all (variable and fixed) costs, yet no firm finds it profitable to enter (under the 
standard assumption that a monopolist does not capture the full social surplus generated by 
entry). In such a case a cooperative firm may feasibly produce, however, if its members bear a 
portion of fixed cost through a membership fee or other lump sum contribution.  
More interesting is the fact that the prospect of entry by a cooperative firm affects the strategy 
of the leader. Extending Etro’s (2008) framework, the leader must consider entry deterrence 
strategies not only with respect to other firms, but also with respect to the possible entry of 
cooperative firms. Entry deterrence of consumer coalitions by an incumbent monopolist was 
extensively analyzed by Sexton and Sexton (1987) and Innes and Sexton (1993). Deterrence of 
consumer coalitions calls for an even more aggressive behavior than that required to deter other 
PM firms. The implication of this observation for the EMS problem analyzed here is that, 
whereas the leader can succeed in securing the market as a monopolist by exploiting its first 
mover advantage, entry deterrence limits the profit that can be realized. This limits the range of 
fixed cost that can be borne by the leader, which in turn expands the region of parameters 
where the cooperative firm enters in response to the absence of a PM firm. 
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2. EMS and entry deterrence  
We consider the simplest possible framework to illustrate the result of interest. For all firms, the 
technology of production is represented by the cost function 
 ( )C Q cQ K= +   
where 0c >  is the constant marginal production cost, and 0K >  is the fixed setup cost that is 
required to enter the market. Following Etro (2008), the model is a three-stage game. In stage 1, 
the PM firm decides whether or not to enter after considering the prospect of competition by 
followers (other PM firms or coalitions of consumers). In stage 2, if the leader PM firm has 
entered, it will play the entry-deterrence strategy as needed. For some domain of K , it turns out 
that other firms do not enter, the consumer coalition does not form, and the leader operates as 
the only firm in equilibrium. In stage 3, if the leader PM firm has not entered, a consumer 
coalition may form, without having to face deterrence. 
For the demand side of the model, for concreteness we assume that there are N  identical 
consumers with quasilinear preferences, such that the aggregate demand function is  
( )D p a p= − , 
with individual demand functions given by ( ) ( ) , 1,2,..., .iD p D p N i N= =  
If the leader can behave as an unconstrained monopolist, given the assumed aggregate demand 
function, then it solves 
max ( )( )
p
a p p c K− − −   
yielding the standard monopoly price ( ) 2mp a c= +   and production level ( ) 2mQ a c= − , 
provided K  is not too large. The monopolist earns positive profit as long as mK K≤  where mK  
is the maximum fixed cost that can be sustained by a monopolist unconstrained by the threat of 
entry: 
(1) ( )
2
4
m a cK
−
≡  
In Stackelberg competition for homogeneous goods where, upon entry, firms compete in 
quantities, the leader can deter entry of other PM firms by producing 2LQ a c K= − − , 
provided ( )2( ) 4K a c K≤ − ≡  (Etro, 2008). The limit price of this equilibrium is  
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(2) 2Lp c K= +   
 
Remark 1. The need to deter entry of other PM firms does not affect the maximum level of fixed 
cost that the leader can bear (because mK K< ).  
 
2.1. The cooperative firm 
Owing to their distinctive governance structure, cooperative firms behave differently than PM 
firms, but in ways that eschew a single modeling approach. The literature has emphasized 
various circumstances in which cooperatives might make production decisions that are more or 
less efficient than a PM firm (Hansmann 1994, 2013; Hart and Moore, 1996; Mikami, 2011). They 
are more responsive to the consumption needs of their members and thus pursue more efficient 
production plans, but they also have coordination and governance costs that a PM firm does not 
face. We follow Innes and Sexton (1993) and capture such governance costs unique to 
cooperative firms by a function ( )G n  that is increasing and concave in the size n N≤  of the 
cooperative. Effectively, therefore, a cooperative firm faces the higher fixed cost of entry 
( )K G n+ . It is assumed that the objective of the cooperative is to maximize the consumer 
surplus of its members, net of all production and governance costs. Hence, the cooperative firm 
would produce the efficient amount ( )D c , which is then allocated to members by marginal cost 
pricing cp c= . Furthermore, if market conditions are such that a coalition of consumers is 
formed, then it is reasonable to focus on the case n N= (i.e., the grand coalition) because 
[ ( )]K G n n+  is decreasing in the cooperative size. In what follows, therefore, we simply write G  
rather than ( )G N  for the total governance cost of the cooperative. 
The foregoing structure is the simplest representation of the cooperative firm that permits us to 
illustrate the main result of the paper. We note, however, that an analogous result can be 
obtained with more general representations of the cooperative decision problem, for example 
one which allows for consumer heterogeneity and where decision are made by majority voting, 
as in Hart and Moore (1996). 
Given efficient production, the combined payoff of the cooperative firm is 
(3) 
2( )
2
a cU K G−= − −  
Hence, the maximum fixed cost that the co-op firm can sustain and still be viable is 
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(4) 
2( )
2
c a cK G−≡ − . 
 
2.2. Deterrence of cooperative entry 
Deterrence of a consumer coalition by an incumbent monopolist who relies on a policy of 
uniform price offers was considered by Sexton and Sexton (1987). Innes and Sexton (1993) 
extend this analysis by allowing the incumbent firm to pursue a “divide-and-conquer” entry 
deterrence strategy, leading to a form of price discrimination. They fully articulate two 
formulations of such a strategy. Our approach here is consistent with their “model II,” which 
maintains the appealing condition that consumers can evaluate their individual offers vis-à-vis 
the gains from various possible coalitions (which, inter alia, rationalizes the focus on the grand 
coalition invoked earlier). When all consumers have identical demands, as in our case, the 
entry-deterring monopolist does not price discriminate. Hence, to deter the cooperative 
formation the leader must commit to a price (or production plan) that grants to the grand 
coalition as much surplus as the latter could generate by itself if it integrated into production.  
The total net surplus enjoyed by the grand coalition is given by (3). When consumers instead 
buy from the leader at any given price p , they get a total surplus 2( ) ( ) 2S p a p= − . Hence, the 
price Dp  that just deters the formation of a cooperative solves ( )DS p U=  yielding  
(5) 2( ) 2( )Dp a a c K G= − − − + . 
 
Remark 2. For sufficiently low governance cost, D Lp p< . To deter the formation of a 
cooperative firm the incumbent may need to behave more aggressively than to deter other PM 
firms.   
 
3. Equilibrium entry 
In the first stage the would-be monopolist has to decide whether or not to enter the market. Let 
m
Dπ  denote the ex post profit of the monopolist (that is, exclusive of its own fixed setup cost K ). 
First, note that deterrence can be achieved by the unconstrained monopoly price mp  if 
(6) 
22 ( )( ) 3
2 2
ma pa c K G u K G−− − − ≤ → ≤ +  
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where 2( ) 8u a c≡ −  is the consumer surplus at the monopoly price mp .  In this case entry is 
blockaded and the monopolist achieves its highest possible profit, which defines the maximum 
fixed cost that it can incur in stage 1 and still be viable, as identified in (1): 2m mD mp u Kπ = ≡ . 
When 3K G u+ < , on the other hand, blockaded entry is not possible and the monopolist must 
use Dp  given in (5) to deter entry. The ex post profit of the monopolist ( )( )
m D D
D p c a pπ = − −  in 
this case depends on the fixed costs K and G  that must be incurred by the cooperative: 
[ ]( )( , ) 2 4 4 ( ) 4 ( )mD K G u u K G u K Gπ = − + − + + . 
The relevant regions of the parameters are illustrated in Figure 1. For a given K  this ex post 
profit is non-decreasing in the cooperative’s coordination cost G . For 3G u K≥ − , entry is 
blockaded by the unconstrained uniform price mp  and the leader reaches the maximum ex post 
profit: 2mD uπ = . But as the coordination cost  decreases below u , price concessions are 
necessary to deter the formation of a consumer coalition, meaning that ( , )mD K Gπ  decreases in G  
for a given K . Hence, the maximum level of fixed cost that the would-be monopolist can 
endure in stage 1 also decreases. Specifically, the region of parameters where the monopolist 
will make nonnegative profit (from a stage 1 perspective, meaning mD Kπ ≥ ) is represented by 
the dotted-shaded area in Figure 1. To the East and South of the boundary of this region, the PM 
firm does not enter. 
The horizontal-line-shaded area in Figure 1 illustrates the parameter space ( , )K G   where the 
PM firm does not enter—and therefore cannot deter the cooperative firm formation—and yet a 
coalition of consumers can be viable. There are two distinct regions of interest where the 
cooperative is viable while the PM firm is not. Areas y  and z  denote the region of the 
parameter space where the cooperative remains viable, while the PM firm is not: here 
2 mK u K> ≡ , and a PM firm cannot be profitable, regardless of whether or not it faces potential 
competition by followers. This parametric region is related to the too-few-by-one case of 
insufficient entry that arises in Mankiw and Whinston (1986). Area x  pertains specifically to the 
EMS framework analyzed in this paper and illustrates our main result. Here, 2 mK u K< ≡ , and 
a PM leader who only needs to deter entry by other PM firms would find it profitable to be in 
the market. The prospect of competition by a cooperative firm, however, erodes the parametric 
region where the PM firm can profitably enter. As the coordination cost G  of the cooperative 
firm decrease, the level of fixed cost that the leader is able to sustain decreases.  
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Main result. In the EMS framework, the need to deter the formation of cooperative firms, in 
addition to the entry of other PM firms, curtails the leader’s ex post profit which affects the 
viability of entry. Thus no PM firm may find it desirable to enter the market, despite having a 
first-mover advantage. A cooperative firm may remain viable under the same production 
conditions, despite having to bear coordination costs that the PM firm does not have.  
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
An incumbent PM monopolist has an incentive to practice entry deterrence strategies not just 
with respect to profit maximizing followers, but also to deter the formation of coalitions of 
consumers (Sexton and Sexton 1987, Innes and Sexton 1993). In this paper, rather than taking 
the position of the incumbent as given, we have followed the EMS literature and assumed that 
an entry cost applies to all active firms (although cooperative firms also have additional 
coordination costs). The analysis uncovers an appealing “raison d’etre” for cooperative firms. It 
defers to the view that a PM firm may be faster at exploiting a market opportunity, compared 
with a cooperative, and thereby gain a first-mover advantage. Such a leader may then be able to 
use entry deterrence strategies to preclude entry by other firms and/or cooperatives. But if the 
fixed setup cost is large enough, the leader may not find it profitable to enter the market. 
Perhaps more subtly, the foregoing analysis shows that the maximum fixed entry cost that the 
3u
K
4u3u
4u
G
2u
x y
z
Leader enters 
and detersu
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leader can endure is endogenous and depends on whether or not it faces the threat of entry by a 
cooperative.  In such a setting, a cooperative firm may nonetheless be viable, despite being 
handicapped (relative to a PM firm) by the need to bear an additional coordination cost. This 
effect is particularly important in the case of nonconvexities because, as shown by Mankiw and 
Whinston (1996), the free-entry equilibrium number of PM firms may well be one or zero.  
The role by which increasing returns to scale may explain the existence of cooperative firms has 
typically been cast somewhat differently: increasing returns lead to monopolies, and patrons 
may be induced to form cooperatives to avoid price exploitation (e.g., Hansmann, 2013). Our 
analysis points to an additional mechanism: fixed costs may be such that no PM firm finds it 
profitable to operate, especially when it faces the threat of entry by consumer coalitions. The 
cooperative organization might be the only viable solution in such an environment.  
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